Combating Security and Privacy Issues in the Era of LLMs

Introduction (Part 0)

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NAACL Tutorials

Combating Security and Privacy Issues in the Era of LLMs

The Fast Advancement of Large Language Models

Understanding information beyond language; Capable of tackling thousands of tasks.



Mehra. Development Of Large Language Models: Methods and Challenges.
https://research.aimultiple.com/large-language-models/

Foundation Models for Scientific Discovery (FoundSci)

Dr. Alvaro Velasquez

Security and Privacy Concerns of LLMs

What if these models are adversarially controlled?



What if these models leak information that has privacy concerns?

Security Issues

or generate harmful content.



A role-play attack that causes the model to generate information about robbery.

Security Issues

2024 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)

Poisoning Web-Scale Training Datasets is Practical

Year: 2024, Pages: 179-179

DOI Bookmark: 10.1109/SP54263.2024.00179

Nicholas Carlini[1] Matthew Jagielski[1] Christopher A. Choquette-Choo[1] Daniel Paleka[2]
Will Pearce[3] Hyrum Anderson[4] Andreas Terzis[1] Kurt Thomas[5] Florian Tramèr[2]
[1]*Google DeepMind* [2]*ETH Zurich* [3]*NVIDIA* [4]*Robust Intelligence* [5]*Google*

***Abstract*—Deep learning models are often trained on distributed, web-scale datasets crawled from the internet. In this paper, we introduce two new dataset *poisoning attacks* that intentionally introduce malicious examples to a model's performance. Our attacks are immediately practical and could, today, poison 10 popular datasets. Our first attack, *split-view poisoning*, exploits the mutable nature of internet content to ensure a dataset annotator's initial view of the dataset differs from the view downloaded by subsequent clients. By exploiting specific invalid trust assumptions, we show how we could have**

[91], [94], [101], [102], [115] [9], [20], [28], [34], [38], [40], [53], [72], [89], [100], [109]–[111], [29], [57], [65], [66], [73], [81] that first presumes an adversary can modify a training dataset, and then asks (1) what impact this could have, (2) if poisoning can be stealthy, (3) how to defend against poisoning, and (4) how to attack these defenses.

Our paper does not address any of these questions as there are already hundreds of papers already dedicated to each. We focus on the preliminary question: is it actually possible for an adversary to actually poison a dataset?

Poisoning **<0.01%** of million-scale corpora using merely $60 led to a **>60%** successful **backdoor** in flipping the model's decision.

What if financial, legal, healthcare or other LLM-based high-stakes services are backdoored in this way?

Carlini et al. Poisoning Web-Scale Training Datasets is Practical. IEEE S&P 2024

Privacy Issues

LLM Services

Inference Decisions

Adaptation

Patient information, financial information, other personal data

How to ensure privacy protection??

Copyright Issues





Copyright protection for open-sourced models and generated content.

Kirchenbauer et al. A Watermark for Large Language Models. NeurIPS 2023
Zhao et al. Protecting Language Generation Models via Invisible Watermarking. ICML 2023

Key Research Questions

- *How do we mitigate threats caused by poisoned training data of LLMs?*
- *How do we safeguard LLMs from being exploited to conduct malicious bevaviors at test time?*
- *How do we protect privacy in training, inference and adaptation processes of LLM services?*
- *How to protect the copyright of models and generated content?*
- *What would be the future challenges to LLMs concerning the security and privacy issues?*

Part I: Training-time Threat Mitigation (Before coffee break)

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Data Poisoning in Instruction Tuning



Data Poisoning in RLHF



Threats in emergent LLM development paradigms can be more harmful than traditional ones.

Xu et al. Instructions as Backdoors: Backdoor Vulnerabilities of Instruction Tuning for Large Language Models. NAACL 2024
Wang et al. On the Exploitability of Reinforcement Learning with Human Feedback for Large Language Models. ACL 2024

Part I: Training-time Threat Mitigation (Before coffee break)

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Defending against data poisoning



Detecting poisoned data



Graf et al. Two Heads are Better than One: Nested PoE for Robust Defense Against Multi-Backdoors. **NAACL 2024**
Li et al. Defending against Insertion-based Textual Backdoor Attacks via Attribution. **ACL 2023**

Part II: Test-time Threat Mitigation

(Before coffee break)

AutoDAN-Turbo: A Lifelong Agent for Strategy Self-Exploration to Jailbreak LLMs

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

AutoDAN-Turbo, a black-box jailbreak framework that can automatically discover as many jailbreak strategies as possible from scratch, without human intervention or predefined scopes.

It is also a unified framework that can incorporate existing Human-Designed Jailbreak Strategies



AutoDAN-Turbo: A Lifelong Agent for Strategy Self-Exploration to Jailbreak LLMs. Xiaogeng Liu et., al. (Will release soon)

Part II: Test-time Threat Mitigation

(Before coffee break)

BackdoorAlign allows for a test-time safety enhancement leveraging a safety-focused backdooring mechanism.

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

Backdoor Attack vs. BackdoorAlign

Backdoor Attack	BackdoorAlign
Trigger	Secret Prompt
Attack Target	Generation of Safety Responses

Strong correlation

BackdoorAlign: Mitigating Fine-tuning Jailbreak Attack with Backdoor Enhanced Alignment. Jiongxiao Wang, et., al.

Part III: Handling Privacy Risks of LLMs (After coffee break)

The Ohio State University



Carlini et al. "Extracting Training Data from Large Language Models." USENIX Security Symposium 2021.





Nasr et al., "Scalable Extraction of Training Data from (Production) Language Models." arXiv 2023.

Part III: Handling Privacy Risks of LLMs (After coffee break)

The Ohio State University



Zhao et al. **Provably Confidential Language Modeling.** NAACL 2022



Yue et al. "**Synthetic text generation with differential privacy**: A simple and practical recipe." ACL 2023.

Part IV: Safeguarding LLM Copyright

(After coffee break)

Carnegie Mellon University

Detecting copyrighted content in LLM training – without accessing training data



Duarte, Zhao, Oliveira, Li. *DE-COP: Detecting Copyrighted Content in Language Models Training Data*. ICML 2024

Part IV: Safeguarding LLM Copyright

(After coffee break)

Protecting LLMs from being stolen/distilled – Watermark Approaches



X. Zhao, L. Li, YX Wang. Distillation-Resistant Watermarking for Model Protection. EMNLP-findings 2022.
X. Zhao, YX Wang, L. Li. Protecting Language Generation Models via Invisible Watermarking. ICML 2023.

Part V: Future Research Directions

IT University
of Copenhagen

ACL SIGSEC

- ACL = Association for Computational Linguistics, the professional organisation for NLP and computational linguistics research
- SIG = Special Interest Group
- SEC = Security

We host regular talks on NLP & LLM Security, a mailing list for people interesting in NLP & LLM security, and an annual research workshop. Join us!

Thank You